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Economics and/of Science: The Meaning(s)
of Financial Bias and the Ideal of
Interest-Free Science in Law
David S. Caudill*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Science costs money and incentives play a key role in science ....
Not all science is created equal when it comes to funding.'
At times, the controversy whether science is degraded or enhanced by
relationships with (or financial support from) commercial industry seems to
reflect the current political-ideological divide between Left and Right, Democrat and Republican, environmentalists and industrialists, and so forth. For
example, a recent online issue of The Scientist included two opinion pieces
offering conflicting viewpoints concerning the growing commercialization of
science. The first opinion, after conceding science has always been funded
and "social forces and political agendas have resulted in significant scientific
progress,"2 nevertheless warned "the current commercialization pressure ...
is an ethos that . . . permeates every corner of the research enterprise, . . .

[raising] the possibility that this pressure could reduce collaborative behavior, thus undermining scientific progress, and contribute to premature application of technologies . . . ."3 On the contrary, according to the second
opinion, industry relationships with science are "unequivocally beneficial."4
Indeed, it is not the financial conflicts of interest that reduce collaborative
behavior, but the "mania .. . that discounts the social value of collaboration
and has mounted an inquisition . . . . Critics' unwarranted allegations that

such conflicts cause bias have limited the sources of intellect that can con-
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1.

PAULA STEPHAN,

2.

Timothy Caulfield, Pressured to Commercialize: Is the Push for Science to
Save the Still Flailing Economy a Threat to Scientific Research?, THE SCIENTIST (May 28, 2012), available at http://the-scientist.com/?articles.view/article
No/32158/title/Opinion-Pressured-to-Commercialize/.

3.

Id.

4.

Thomas P. Stossel, What's Wrong with COI?, THE SCIENTIST (June 12, 2012),
available at http://the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/32190/title/Opin
ion-What-s-Wrong-with-COI-/.

How

EcoNoMics SHAPES SCIENCE

127 (2012).
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tribute to a given project."5 Note the term "collaboration," with all of its
positive connotations in both editorials, has a completely different meaning
for its respective authors. In the first, collaboration implies the cooperation of
scientists in sharing knowledge, to which commercialization is a threat.6 In
the second, collaboration refers to cooperation between scientists and industry, to which concerns about funding and implied conflicts of interest are a
threat.7
This is a battle of images. The (i) threats to "traditional scientific standards of objectivity and independence" as well as the "normal open science,"
brought on by commercialization of research (wherein scientists fail to
"share their data and results freely")8 are pitted against the (ii) "hard-won"
advances "in medical and surgical care" due to industry collaborations9-the
latter of which are nowadays threatened by "sheer prejudice," "blatant intellectual dishonesty," and "a prosecutorial racket that forces companies to pour
money into settling dubious allegations."O
Images of scientific research and funding conventions have important
legal ramifications. For example, when a trial judge or agency administrator
evaluates the integrity of a scientific expert or risk assessment report, is industry affiliation or sponsorship of research a marker of bias, and should the
results of "independent" research be given greater weight? In the discourse
concerning the commercialization of science, there are various positions reflecting different images of how science is affected by, or alternatively rises
above, financial or economic pressures or entanglements. One view, perhaps
idealistic and caricatured by economist Phillip Mirowski as a linear narrative
entitled "Annals of Decline," longs for the virtue and purity of science free
from economics. "Back in the golden day there may have been an invisible
college, chorused sweetly in concert in the quest for truth, they lament, but
now there are only feckless individual entrepreneurs scrabbling for the next
short-term contract . . . .

In contrast, the more common view is that science is costly; for example, Robert Boyle's wealth and Galileo's Medici patrons betray the inevitable
economic aspects of the scientific enterprise.12 Then the real debate begins on
the question of whether financial interests or entanglements are: (i) relatively
5.

Id.

6.

See Caulfield, supra note 2.

7.

See Stossel, supra note 4.

8.

Caulfield, supra note 2.

9. Stossel, supra note 4.
10. Id.
11.

PHILLIP MIROWSKI,

SCIENCE-MART:

PRIVATIZING

AMERICAN

(2011).
12. See David Goodstein & James Woodward, Inside Science, 68
83, 86, 90 (1999).

SCIENCE

87

AM. SCHOLAR

Economics and/of Science

2013]

249

benign, insofar as science is externally supported, but not internally affected
by money (except in the case of fraud, the occasional bad apple); 3 (ii) seriously influential, especially nowadays, but generally good for science by fostering efficiency and innovation;I4 or (iii) seriously influential, especially
nowadays, with identifiable pernicious effects which variously degrade the
quality of science, including the science on which law relies in litigation and
policy contexts.
Financial conflicts of interest in the pharmaceutical industry drew an
alarming headline in late 2012: "As Drug Industry's Influence Over Research
Grows, So Does Potential for Bias."15 Since the mid-1980s, research funding
by pharmaceutical firms has exceeded the expenses of the National Institutes
of Health.16 Although the discovery of errors in industry-funded research
does not mean money biased the researcher's findings-"errors are part of
science"-the "odds of coming to a conclusion favorable to industry are 3.6
times greater in research sponsored by the industry than in research sponsored by government and nonprofit groups." 7 Concerns therefore arise that

13.

See generally id. (identifying an inevitable economic aspect of science, and
numerous other structures, such as the reward system and authority structure of
scientific activity that ensure scientific progress and the production of useful
results, notwithstanding the fact that individual scientists may be motivated by
selfish interests and not the public good). See also, e.g., Jeff Akst, Anesthesiologist Fabricates 172 Papers, THE SCIENTIST (July 3, 2012), available at http://
www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/32312/title/AnesthesiologistFabricates-172-Papers/; Hayley Dunning, Parkinson's Researcher Fabricated
Data, THE SCIENTIST (June 29, 2012), available at http://www.the-scientist
.com/?articles.view/articleNo/32305/title/Parkinson-s-Researcher-FabricatedData/ (fraud continues to be a temptation for a relatively small number of
scientists).

14.

See

MIROWSKI,

supra note 11, at 87-88. ("At the risk of caricature," Mirowski

entitles this "linear narrative," "'Ripping Tales of Progress'. .

.

. Admittedly,

many of these purveyors of glad tidings would still regard themselves as defending the preservation of an 'optimal' sphere of research reserved for open
public science and pure unfocused curiosity . . . .").
15.

Peter Whoriskey, As Drug Industry's Influence Over Research Grows, So Does
Potentialfor Bias, WASH. PosT, (Nov. 25, 2012), available at http://articles
.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-24/business/35511825_1_ drug-companies-avan
dia-steven-e-nissen. See also, e.g., Katherine Eban, Dirty Medicine, FORTUNE
BLOG http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2013/05/15/ranbaxy-fraud-lipitor/?
section=magazines-fortune (a more recent investigation into fabricated data in
the pharmaceutical industry, involving generic drugs).

16.

Whoriskey, supra note 15.

17.

Id. (construing Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of FinancialConflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454,
454 (2003)). "Aggregating the results of [1140 original studies] showed a statistically significant association between industry sponsorship and pro-industry
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companies can shape "their research to obscure the dangerous side effects."18
Specifically, "when the company is footing the bill, the opportunities for bias
are manifold: . . . design[ing] research that makes their products look better . .. select[ing] like-minded academics to perform the work . . . [a]nd ...

run[ning] statistics in ways that make their own drugs look better than they
are." 19

Moreover, the concerns over bias extend beyond biomedical research
into fields such as nutrition-related scientific articles, where industry funding
"may bias conclusions in favor of a sponsor's products, with significant implications for public health."20 Even when ethicists (or bioethicists) are engaged to oversee the work of laboratories, conflicts of interest arise if the
laboratories fund the oversight; "overt and covert pressures may be placed
upon ethicists to make conclusions conducive to the progression and advancement of the overall science of a project."21

Distinctions need to be made among those who identify pernicious effects of the commercialization of science, including industry-sponsored research and university-industry linkages between those who focus on bad
actors (scientists who are willing to compromise scientific integrity for
money), and those who focus on the indirect, negative effects of economic
pressures on even the best science and best scientists. Critics in the former
category tend to hold fairly conventional ideals concerning science-independence, transparency, and social disengagement-while those in the latter
category tend to see scientific knowledge as co-produced, or "mutually constituted" by, economic and social structures. 22 Most importantly, critics in the
former category tend to predominate in legal discourse concerning the adverse effects of industry on science and scientific expertise, and the purpose
conclusions (pooled Mantel-Haenszel odds ratio, 3.60; 95% confidence interval, 2.63-4.91)." Id.
18.

Id.

19.

Id.; see also Sheldon Krimsley, The Ethical and Legal Foundations of Scientific "Conflict of Interest", in LAW AND ETHICS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH:
REGULATION, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, AND LIABILITY 63, 63-81 (T. Lemmens

& D.R. Waring eds., 2006).
20.

Lenard I. Lesser et al., Relationship between Funding Source and Conclusion
Among Nutrition-Related Scientific Articles, 4 PuB. LiB. SCI. MED. 41, 41

(2007) (studying the financial sponsorship of three commonly consumed
beverages).
21.

Lynne Kiesling et al., Paved with Good Intentions: Rethinking the Ethics of
ELSI Research, 42 J. RES. ADMIN., no. 2, 2011 at 15, 23 (discussing Ethical,
Legal, and Social Implications ["ELSI"] research and the role of ethics centers
funded by a larger grant for scientific research).

22.

PHILLIP MIROWSKI, THE EFFORTLESS ECONOMY OF SCIENCE?

117, 132 (2004).
See also, e.g., Brendon Swedlon, Cultural Coproduction of Four States of
Knowledge, 37 SCI. TECH. & Hum. VALUES 151 (2012).
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of this article is to highlight the significance of critics in the latter category
for law and legal discourse.
In section II, I briefly introduce the notion that the economy "shapes"
science, and in section HI, I discuss the perceived direct, adverse effects of
industry on science in legal contexts. In section IV, I discuss the indirect
effects of commercial culture-"less overt, but far more pervasive"23-on
science. I conclude, in section V, that legal discourses concerning scientific
expertise would be enriched by viewing science as structured and constituted,
not merely influenced or supported, by economic forces.
II.

ECONOMICS AND SCIENCE

While the idea that the 20th century was a golden age of science
free from outside influence is clearly mythic . . . [,] it is also clear

that the relations between public science and private profit have
shifted dramatically over the past 30 years . ... .24
A.

No Cause for Alarm

While much of the literature concerning recent changes in the funding
of scientific research is alarmist, some of it is not. For example, Paula Stephan's highly descriptive analysis in her recent How Economics Shapes Sciences,25 borders on identifying economic factors in science as mundane. Of
course "costs affect the way research is conducted" and "the pace of discovery;" of course scientists and "universities respond to incentives;" and while
scientists are motivated by puzzle solving and recognition, "scientists take
some interest in financial rewards."26 Typically, a scientist's work is rewarded with higher salaries, external funding (which, in turn, affects salary),
and royalties from patents; all of which provide incentives for productivity.27
While the landscape is changing dramatically, there is little drama in Stephan's description. "By the early 1960s, the notion of keeping a distance
between the university and commercial operations was in decline. Universities had begun to develop their own offices for technology transfer . . . . By

the mid-1990s, almost all research universities had an office of technology

23.

DANIEL LEE KLEINMAN, IMPURE CULTURES: UNIVERSITY
WORLD OF COMMERCE

BIOLOGY AND THE

5 (2003).

24.

Rebecca Lave, Philip Mirowski & Samuel Randalls, Introduction: STS and Neoliberal Science, 40 Soc. STUD. SCI. 659, 660 (2010).

25.

See

26.

Id. at 2-3, 16.

27.

See id. at 42-43, 45, 50-51. There is "nothing new about faculty patenting.

STEPHAN,

supra note 1.

What is new is the rate at which faculty are patenting, the amount of revenues
universities and faculty receive from patents, and the direct involvement of
universities in managing patents." Id. at 45.
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transfer."28 More faculty members in the sciences are involved in start-up
companies, lucrative consulting arrangements with industry, and industrysponsored research.29
Is there a cause for alarm? Is science impeded, is the quality of scientific
knowledge decreased, and do patents limit academic scientists' access to
materials and instruments?30 There are "some [who] argue, for example, that
the financial rewards associated with inventive activity encourage faculty to
substitute applied research for basic research. Others argue that patenting diverts faculty from doing research that is published and hence made publicly
available."31 For Stephan, the evidence suggests "patenting and publishing go
hand in hand," as scientists generate "both fundamental insights and solutions to problems."32 There are potential impediments to research if patents
are "managed poorly" or if universities "become overly aggressive" and discourage knowledge diffusion.33 There are also concers over transparency
(e.g., not disclosing industry support) and ghost-writing by industry (i.e.,
recruiting academic scientists as co-authors). 34 Industry support is also worrisome due to "the control that industry may exert over publications and intellectual property coming out of the research," and university/industry
alliances "clearly dampen the speed with which knowledge is disseminated"
and limit faculty ability "to choose their own research topics."35 However,
"research is an expensive business," and, unfortunately, the current system of

28.

Id. at 46.

29.

See id. at 52-57.

30.

See id. at 57.

31.

STEPHAN, supra note 1, at 57. See also, e.g., Hanna Hottenrott & Susanne
Thorwath, Industry Funding of University Research and Scientific Productivity,
CTR. EUR. EcON. RES. 1 (2011), ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp10105.pdf
(showing a higher share of industry funding of a professor's research budget
results in lower subsequent publication outcomes, both quantitatively and qualitatively); Liza Vertinsky, Making Knowledge and Making Drugs? Experimenting with University Innovation Capacity, 62 EMORY L. J. 741, 745-76
(2013) (proposing legal reforms to "address the tensions between open science
and proprietary development," to support "innovation in the public interest,"
and to expand "university monitoring, disclosure, and reporting requirements
designed to increase the transparency, accountability, and responsibility of universities in the management of drug development activities.").

32.

STEPHAN, supra note 1, at 57. See also, e.g., Rosa Grimaldi et al., 30 Years
After Bayh-Dole: Reassessing Academic Entrepreneurship, 40 RES. POL'Y
1045, 1055 (2011) ("[T]he rise of commercialization associated with the Bayh-

Dole Act has not resulted in less basic research").
supra note 1, at 58.

33.

STEPHAN,

34.

Id. at 58, 59.

35.

Id. at 118.
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government funding leads faculty to be risk averse. 36 We can certainty do
better, Stephan concludes, than a system that "discourages faculty from pursuing research with uncertain outcomes," as well as discouraging collaboration and inefficiently producing too many scientists and not enough grants
for job security.37 Possible solutions are focused on efficient allocation of
resources (e.g., discourage soft-money faculty hiring, uncouple research and
training, fund more training grants, reward collaboration),38 but there is
seemingly no cause for alarm over the systematic effects of the economy on
scientific research.

B.

The Alarmist Perspective

Other authors seem to go beyond a sense of worry to a sense of crisis.
Some, for example, do not consider themselves to be "alarmist" in their view
that the production and dissemination of science has been impeded by commercialization.39 That alarmist label is reserved for those who long for the
ideal scientific community-independent, freely sharing knowledge-that
never really existed.40 However, Mirowski and Van Horn distance themselves radically from the sanguine authors who treat "the 'producers' (universities) and 'consumers' (firms) as persisting relatively unscathed through
the process of commercialization.. . . [T]heir central tendency is to .. . argue

36.

Id. at 148-49. See also, e.g., Joel Werner, What's Ailing our Science?, THE
AUSTRALIAN 33 (2012), available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/highereducation/whats-ailing-our-science/story-e6frgcjx-1226428415568 ("Research
is becoming more conservative in its nature," says [Darren] Saunders, [senior
research officer at the Garvan Institute in Sydney]. "Truly groundbreaking science is inherently risky. There's a chance it might not work. Because the system is trying to do its best with a small amount of money, it wants to bet on a
sure-fire winner."). See also Jewel Topsfield, Science Subject Comes Under
Fire, THE AGE 7 (2012), available at http://www.theage.com.au/national/educa
(Australian nation/science-subject-comes-under-fire-20120718-22alp.html
tional secondary science curriculum, according to some teachers, "panders to
the mining industry in. . . [e]arth and [e]nvironmental [s]cience, with climate
change, sustainability and biodiversity barely rating a mention;" one of the
textbooks used "was partly funded by Woodside Petroleum," and teachers
"have a whole lot of money thrown at them from mining companies for personal development and textbooks.").

37.

STEPHAN,

38.

See id. at 232-35.

39.

See Lave et al., supra note 24, at 667.

40.

See Philip Mirowski & Robert Van Horn, The Contract Research Organization
and the Commercializationof Scientific Research, 35 Soc. STUD. Sci. 503, 503
(2005) ("Their writing tends to be long on anecdotal horror stories, but rather

supra note 1, at 229-30.

short on specifics . . . ."). Mirowski wants to "raise the historical question of

whether . .. images of the disinterested operation of science ever actually corresponded to research practices on the ground." Id. at 508.
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that the growing modern commercialization of scientific research was 'inevitable,' and that there exists little evidence that it has 'significantly changed
the allocation of university research efforts.' "41
While Mirowski and Van Horn are critical of such conclusions with
respect to university science,42 they are also critical of
[T]he unexamined presumption that the university is the primary
field upon which the privatization of research has played out. We
contend that the re-engineering of the structures of scientific research since the 1980s . . . was nurtured by the creation of new

social structures of research, which act as prototypes outside the
university: new forms of intellectual property, new communication technologies, new research protocols, new career paths, and
new institutions of command and control . . . . In other words,

universities may not necessarily be the most perspicuous of entities for a study of those consequences. 43
Focusing on the corporate sphere, and particularly the pharmaceutical
sector,44 Mirowski and Van Horn identify the post-1980 "Contract Research
Organization" (CRO) as paradigmatic of privatized science as well as the
perfect foil to those who insist "science conducted in a for-profit modality
has had no deleterious effects upon the conduct of research."45 However, in
contrast to "alarmists" who see the commercialization of science as a marker
of decline, Mirowski and Van Horn add that "accusations of corruption must
be judged on a case-by-case basis."46
Mirowski and Van Horn begin with a "conventional" historical account
of the rise of CROs.47 Since the Food and Drug Administration "require[s]
that drug companies . . . demonstrate the safety and efficiency of a drug

41.

Id. at 504 (construing Richard Nelson, Observations on the Post Bayh-Dole
Rise of Patenting at American Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 13, 14

(2001)).
42. Mirowski & Van Horn, supra note 40, at 504. See also, e.g., Lave et al., supra
note 24, at 664, 669 ("[P]articular regimes of science management and funding
have specific and profound impacts on the character of scientific production;"
"the character of the university is changing as new privatized regimes of scientific management shift the sources and quantities of funding, the organization
of research and teaching, and the intellectual and commercial status of knowledge claims.").
43. Mirowski & Van Horn, supra note 40, at 504.
44. See id. at 537.Significantly, Mirowski and Van Horn believe that "the new
phenomena of research we have identified in the pharmaceutical sector may
also become more prevalent elsewhere."
45.

Id. at 507.

46.

Id. at 508.

47.

See id. at 508.
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before marketing it," and mandates an expensive and time-consuming fourstage process for drug development (preclinical or animal, clinical, regulatory delay, and post-clinical), pharmaceutical companies in the postwar period looked for ways to reduce costs and delay.48
Recruiting subjects, managing diverse trials in different settings,
monitoring and recording data, subjecting data to statistical controls and higher level analyses, and writing up the results for publication all absorb vast amounts of time and money. . . . [Thus]

there arose the impression of a conflict between conventional
norms of (academic) science and the commercial imperatives operating in the drug development process. 4 9
Although deregulation initiatives in the 1990s reduced the time between
a new drug application and FDA approval,
[T]he duration of the clinical development cycle was lengthening .... In the corporate view, the remedy .. . was a new breed of
scientific researcher who was more comfortable with the deadlines, and who focused more intently upon the specific of the FDA
guidelines ... . The pharmaceutical companies were casting about
for a specifically engineered research entity to impose cost constraint, and some far-sighted entrepreneurs provided it in the
1980s .

.

. in the form of the contract research organization.50

While the explanations for the trend of outsourcing research and development, and the rise of CROs varied, the efficiency and cost-savings were
obvious-CROs offered "targeted drug expertise, timely clinical trial completion, and eventually 'end-to-end outsourcing support for all phases of
clinical research' at a comparatively low cost."51 Globalization also played a
role, as the CRO industry could provide "cross-cultural expertise in international clinical studies."52 In terms of advances in instrumentation,
"pharmacogenetics and pharmacogenomics ... opened up further opportunities for CROs to displace AHCs [academic health centers]," their primary
competitor.53
For Mirowski and Van Horn, this conventional account of the rise of
CROs is significant because it focuses on economic pressures and cost-savings, thereby eclipsing the advantages (to the pharmaceutical industry) of
reconstructing clinical research "within a more thoroughly privatized frame48.

Id. at 508-509.

49.

Mirowski & Van Horn, supra note 40, at 509-10.

50.

Id. at 510.

51.

Id. at 511.

52.

Id. at 511-12.

53.

Id. at 512.
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work."54 Data is "rendered more dependably proprietary"-information
about the "conduct of CRO research is less accessible than "under the earlier
academic regime"-such that the "conduct of scientific research has been
profoundly altered" to adjust to the "traffic and rhythms of corporate privatized science."55 Mirowski and Van Horn offer five examples of "structural
changes in the organization of science."56
1. Research on Human Subjects
Unlike the often busy, slow institutional review boards (IRBs) at universities and non-profit institutions, independent IRBs (permitted by the FDA in
1981)-usually bioethics consultants (a commodification of the function)are used by CROs to expedite research.57 CROs are "not tied to any particular geographic locale or academic setting" and can negotiate lower cost
clinical trials overseas.5 8 Overseas, scientific protocols are often re-engineered to involve coercion and less than informed consent. For example,
"some of these countries waive or reduce the requirement of pre-clinical
animal trials," and CROs can avoid United States physicians' demand for
generous recruitment fees.59
Jeanne Lenzer's article on the problem, published in the British Medical
Journal,confirms the notion that CROs have taken much of the clinical trial
market away from academic medical centers, and raises concern that "CROs
face a fundamental conflict of interest-if they do not please their commercial clients, they may be less likely to get more work from them. Instances of
study bias favouring the sponsor .

.

. suggest that independence may have its

limits."60 Lenzer also notes "CROs reduce costs partly by [recruiting] volunteers quickly and partly by recruiting from impoverished regions of the
world," and "the ability of a sponsor to pick and choose which organisation
will conduct a trial, raises questions about who, ultimately, is in control of

54. Id. at 513.
55. Mirowski & Van Horn, supra note 40, at 513-14.
56.

Id. at 514.

57.

See id. at 515.

58.

Id. at 516.

59.

Id. at 517. See also Roy Spece Jr., Direct and Enhanced Disclosure of Researcher FinancialConflicts of Interest: The Role of Trust (May 2012), availa-

ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2088244 (discussing the problem of conflicts of
interests in payments to physicians to enroll subjects in clinical trials and the
need for enhanced disclosure).
BRIT. MED. J. 602, 602, 604
(2008) (statement of Professor Lisa Bero, Univ. Cal. S.F.: "[Y]ou can ask a

60. Jeanne Lenzer, Truly Independent Research?, 337

question which you know will give a favourable answer for the funder-and
not ask other questions.").
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the research design and the questions being asked."61 However, Lenzer concludes "academic research organizations are little better than commercial
CROs . . . . [I]n the process of competing for research dollars [they have]
started looking and acting just like their commercial counterparts in order to
placate their sponsors."62
2.

Disclosure and Confidentiality

Mirowski and Van Horn argue the "actual structures of disclosure and
confidentiality have become much more complicated" than simply recognizing we need some level of "open science" for scientific progress and some
level of confidentiality to protect the proprietary interests of commercial entities or the research and publication priorities of scientists.63 Once "commercialization gets institutionalized, a completely different menu of possibilities
is on offer"-for example, conflicts of interest, typically associated with the
fear of bias ("industry funding is highly correlative with results favorable to
the study's sponsor"), also raise concerns about open science and disclosure
("scientists with industry support are more likely . . . to deny others access to

data and research materials").64
With respect to disclosure of financial sponsorship, the literature warning of conflicts of interest in industry funding of scientific research is substantial. "Growing evidence from the tobacco, pharmaceutical and medical
fields suggests that financial interests of researchers may compromise their
professional judgment and lead to research results that are biased in favor of
commercial interests."65 For example, concerns over industry involvement in
alcohol science-including sponsorship of research funding organizations,
direct funding of university scientists, and CRO studies-have given rise to
guideline proposals, such as recommendations that alcohol researchers
should (i) pay attention to hidden funding sources, (ii) be prepared to demon-

61.
62.

Id. at 603-04.
Id. at 605 (statement of Jennifer Washburn, Senior Fellow at the New Am.
Found. in Washington, D.C.).

63.
64.

Mirowski & Van Horn, supra note 40, at 517.
Id. at 517-18. See, e.g., David Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results
in Academic Life Science: Evidence from a National Survey of Faculty, 277 J.
AM. MED. Ass'N 1224, 1224 (1997) ("Withholding of research results is not a
widespread phenomenon among life-science researchers. However, withholding is more common among the most productive and entrepreneurial faculty.").
But see John P. Walsh & Wei Hong, Secrecy is Increasing in Step with Competition, Correspondence, 422 NATURE 801, 802 (2003) ("Secrecy is strongly predicted by scientific competition . . . The effects of commercial activity, on the
other hand, are quite mixed. Patenting has no effect; industry funding is associated with greater secrecy; but having industry collaborators is associated with
less secrecy.").
Kerstin Stenius & Thomas F. Babor, The Alcohol Industry and Public Interest
Science, 105 ADDICTION 181, 191 (2009).

65.
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strate no funding source dictates or influences the research design, data collection, or interpretation, and (iii) retain ownership of data and rights to
publish.66 Mirowski and Van Horn view recommendations such as retaining
publication and ownership rights as idealistic.67 Guidelines have also been
proposed for financial conflicts of interest in food science, recommending
researchers (i) avoid favoring a particular outcome [or accepting] remuneration geared to the outcome of a research project, (ii) disclose financial interests in publications, and (iii) guarantee accessibility to all data.68 In the
investigation of panels that write guidelines for the diagnosis and treatment
of drug patients, the "links with pharmaceutical companies are more worrying than the financial conflicts known to plague clinical trials and reviews, . . . because the guidelines have such a direct effect on the drugs that
doctors prescribe . . . . 'Drug company sponsors see guideline-issuing bodies

as perfect places to exert influence."69
Again there is a call for ethical guidelines (to govern those who produce
clinical guidelines) on the basis that "the influence exerted by industry
money is unconscious but powerful;" but avoiding conflicts of interest may
be unrealistic-"bodies that produce [clinical] guidelines maintain that there
just aren't enough experts without conflicts of interest."7o
This tension also arises in the context of peer review functions
generally:
Setting a scientist with commercial interests in pharmaceuticals to
review papers on the effects of pharmaceuticals, or to write a review article on it, would endanger the autonomy and credibility of
science and call for only 'pure' academics to perform such tasks.
On the other hand, taking part in the review of . .. a programme

may disqualify the evaluator. . .from applying for grants from the
programme . . . [and] conflict[ing] with a scholar's research

interests.

66.

. .

71

Id. at 192, 195-96.

67. See Mirowski & Van Hom, supra note 40, at 517-18 (A study conducted in
1990 suggests clinical trial contracts often contain "restraint clauses, confidentiality provisions, publication embargoes, and a host of other legal controls
over proprietary information.").
68.

Sylvia Rowe et al., Funding Food Science and Nutrition Research: Financial
Conflicts and Scientific Integrity, 89 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1285, 1288

(2009).
69.

Rosie Taylor & Jim Giles, Cash Interests Taint Drug Advice, 437 NATURE
1070, 1070 (2005) (quoting Drummond Rennie, deputy editor of the JAMA.).

70.

Id. at 1071.

71.

Liv Langfeld & Svein Kyvik, Researchers as Evaluators: Tasks, Tensions and
Politics, 62 HIGHER EDUC. 199, 205 (2011).

2013]

Economics and/of Science

259

Moreover, perhaps "judging research by who funded it is simply not the way
the academic community proceeds."72 Kevin Quinn, a professor at Berkeley
states, "[w]hile it may well be the case that some research that is funded by
interested parties is bad research .

. .

, it is not necessarily the case that all, or

even most, such research is biased or inaccurate."73
Criticizing Justice Souter's rejection of research funded in part by Exxon in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,74 Lee Epstein and Charles Clarke argue
that while "treating funded research with some degree of skepticism is not
without merit," Justice Souter "implies that, even if research is reliable, valid,
and transparent, it is still biased or otherwise lacking integrity if parties with
a direct interest in the lawsuit support it .

. .

. [T]hese standards [i.e., reliabil-

ity, validity, and transparency] are the best available criteria to detect bias in
research."75 While "associations between the conclusion of a study and the
source of its funding" have been demonstrated, commercial research is not "a
bad thing per se," and research integrity has not been widely undermined by
"financial conflicts of interest."76
Mirowski and Van Horn question the "tendency to cast the problem" of
conflicts of interest "as a matter of individual responsibility, rather than a
structural problem in the organization of science."77 The problem in most of
science is not "personal biases or special interests," or that "investigators are
crudely falsifying the data or otherwise abandoning their commitment to
truth."78 There have always been "small but cumulatively decisive ways for
the data to be biased [in] the selection of subjects, . . . protocols for handling
and reporting side effects, deciding whether to use placebos . . ., decisions
about what constitutes a drug's efficacy . . . , and decisions about when to

end a trial."79
The privatization of science in the form of CROs, however, "tends to
insulate them from internal and external critique," and "conflicts of interest
72.

Lee Epstein & Charles E. Clarke, Jr., Academic Integrity and Legal Scholarship in the Wake of Exxon Shipping, Footnote 17, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y. REV.
33, 42 (2010).

73.

Id. at 42-43. See also Donald J. Kochan, The PoliticalEconomy of the Productions of Customary InternationalLaw: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in U.S. Courts, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 240, 261-63 (2004) (Financial

interests are not limited to "industry," as nonprofit institutions are typically
identifiable as "interest groups.").
74.

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 n.17 (2008).

75.

Epstein & Clarke, supra note 72, at 41, 50.

76.

Id. at 37, 40 (quoting Editorial, A New Policy on Financial Disclosure, 4
TURE NEUROSCIENCE

961, 961 (2001)).

77. Miroswki & Van Horn, supra note 40, at 521.
78. Id. at 519, 521.
79.

Id. at 519.
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are not perceived [by CROs] as a problem requiring special remedy or concern."80 Of course, CROs do not worry about "open science"-but some universities with industry relationships also readily "accept restrictions on
proprietary information" and align "their practices to better resemble those of
CROs" to compete for industry funds.81

The demise of free sharing of information to advance science is also the
subject of some controversy in science literature. Some scientists divulge "results only after . . . accepted for publication" because they see science as

"often a cutthroat venture."82 Secrecy is therefore not necessarily associated
with the commercialization of science, and some studies have found that increased secrecy over the last thirty years "seems to result from a combination
of increasing commercial linkages and increased pressures from scientific
competition."83

A survey of data withholding among geneticists found an increase in the
practice, due perhaps to recent progress in the field, "since scientists are generating large numbers of new findings that stimulate . . . jockeying for scientific priority [, but] commercial applications of genetic research, along with
increased dependence on industry funding and the rise of commercial norms
in the academy, may be particularly responsible as well."84 Moreover, "having engaged in commercialization of university-based research was significantly associated with increased likelihood of data withholding."85
This raises the question of whether scientific progress is slowed by secrecy. In the field of plant research, for example, a recent study found that
while research is more open in academic science than in private research, "it
becomes more closed as the two collaborate . . . . [I]ndustry collaborators

reach through academic collaborators to alter academic interactions and exchanges, curbing the spread of scientific materials and ideas."86

80.

Id. at 519, 522.

81.

Id. at 518.

82. Frederick Southwick, All's Not Fairin Science and Publishing, THE SCIENTIST,
July 2012, available at http://the-scientist.com/2012/07/01/alls-not-fair-in-sci
ence-and-publsihing/.
83.

Wei Hong & John P. Walsh, For Money or Glory? Commercialization, Competition, and Secrecy in the Entrepreneurial University, 50 Soc. Q. 145, 145
(2009). "[C]ompetition for priority .. . spurs effort [but] also produces negative
effects that recent trends toward commercialization . .. seem to be exacerbat-

ing." Nevertheless, the "focus on commercialization as the cause [of increased
secrecy] may understate the effects of scientific competition." Id. at 163.
84.

Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics, 287 JAMA

473, 479 (2002).
85.

Id.

86.

James A. Evans, Industry Collaboration,Scientific Sharing, and the Dissemi-

nation of Knowledge, 40 Soc. STUD. Sci. 757, 781 (2010).
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Finally, the question arises whether patenting is a major concern in restricting access to data; some researchers have concluded that patents "are
not determinative" in existing "restrictions imposed on the flow of information" among "biomedical researchers."87 Mirowski and Van Hom, however,
see a significant effect of patents on the process of research-not its products-in research tool patents and materials transfer agreements.
3.

IP and Research Tools

"[Materials Transfer Agreements (MTAs)] may stipulate payment for
using a device, organism, reagent, database or software program; but . . .
[they] have become the most common means to impose prepublication review [and] disclosure restrictions upon . . . actual use."88 MTAs often include
"reach-through" or "grantback" provisions that render them "the logical complement of the CRO. The CRO is prohibited by its original service contract
from appropriating IP; the academic researcher is dissuaded from seeking to
appropriate IP through the MTA contract."89 Mirowski is particularly critical
of the social science research claiming "patents rarely interfere with research,
and even materials transfers are processed without incident."90 Hard "quantitative data on MTAs" is hard to find, and Mirowski not only doubts the
reliance on surveys and questionnaires sent to samples of scientists, but highlights the strikingly different results in surveys conducted by biomedical professionals.91 Somewhat reflecting a fear of conspiracy theories, Mirowski
points out that the researchers who find little effect of MTAs "have themselves displayed long track records of propounding and defending the commercialization of scientific research and the privatization of the university
more generally."92 Moreover, the survey evidence from this group is not so
different from that of the biomedical researchers "except, of course, in its
interpretation."93 "The bottom line is that these social scientists, if and when
they venture to ask the 'right' questions, find [the same or larger] proportions
of scientists inconvenienced or worse by the whole panoply of IP surround-

87.

Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research, 8 INNOVATION PoL'Y & ECON. 1, 1 (2008).

88. Mirowski & Van Horn, supra note 40, at 525.
89. Id. at 526.
90.

MIROWSKI, supra note I1, at 174 (construing John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho &

Wesley M. Cohen, Supporting Online Materials for View From the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002 (2005), www.sciencemag.org/

cgi/content/full/309/5743/2002/DC 1).
91.

Id. at 174-75.

92. Id. at 175.
93. Id. at 176. See also id. at 176-79 (critiquing the methodology used by these
social scientists.).
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ing research tools requested from external sources."94 Their failure is that
they do not "combine all common legal means of discouraging research into
a single portmanteau category in order to ask: what constitutes the totality of
effects of fortified IP on scientific research?"95 Their defense is that scientists
have always withheld findings, but since there is an increase in withholding,
the "relevant question is what happened to contemporary structural changes
in how scientists interact in treating the communal aspects of research
tools."96 For example, while there is evidence that "faculty who are more
actively engaged in patenting may be less likely to collaborate with outsiders
on research. . . . [which] appear[s] to be hindering innovation,"97 another

study shows increased secrecy among university scientists even when not
seeking patents. 98
4.

Publication and Authorship

"[T]he commercialization of science has not only had an impact on the
level of disclosure of findings, but is also slowly changing the very meaning
of the 'scientific author.' "99 Honorary or "gift" co-authorships to "famous or
otherwise influential figures" provide a conventional example of "authorial
voices . . . becom[ing] unhinged from authorial identities."oo However, the

practice of ghost authorship, wherein "researchers agree to put their names
on texts . . . composed by unnamed third parties, who [have] final control
over the content of the manuscript,"1l signals a "breakdown of ethical standards and editorial oversight."102 In one recent assessment, ghostwriting
function alongside seeding trials (marketing under the guise of a clinical
trial), publication planning (turning industrial data into journal articles), and
selective publication to "distort the medical literature and undermine clinical
trial research, explicitly by obscuring information that is relevant to patients

94.

Id. at 179.

95.

Id. at 180.

96.

MIROWSKI, supra note

97.

Joshua B. Powers & Eric G. Campbell, Technology CommercializationEffects
on the Conduct of Research in Higher Education, 52 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 245,

11, at 180-81.

245 (2011).
98.

See Jeremy M. Grushcow, Measuring Secrecy: A Cost of the Patent System
Revealed, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2004). This increased secrecy could be related to a loss of a sense of reciprocity and collegiality, which could be related
to commercialization. Id. at 78.

99.

Mirowski & Van Horn, supra note 40, at 527.

100. Id. at 528.

101. Id.
102. Id. at 531.
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and physicians."03 "Ghost authorship is ethically questionable in that it may
be used to mask conflicts of interest with industry."104 Thus it has been suggested that medical journals should not publish commercially-sponsored
articles. 05
However, this assessment "unduly personalizes what is clearly a structural phenomenon" with respect to CROs.106 Commentators and concerned
editors "are still operating within the parameters of an older conception of
science, in which authorship credit in journals is framed as a 'reward' for
scientific effort, linked to an identifiable personality . . . . But the CROs

participate in an altogether different kind of economy . ."107 There is "no
single person or small number of people . . . behind the information disseminated . . . there are only the contractual obligations of the corporation."os

5.

The Ends of Science
There is a strong tendency in the literature commenting upon the
contemporary regime of commercialized science . . . to discount

its impact by suggesting that, at most, industry funding may have
had some minor influence on changing the means by which research is prosecuted, but by no stretch of the imagination has it
transformed the ends of science.109

Perhaps that tendency is due to a narrow focus on universities, but there
is a "possibility that the commercialization of science actually changes
103. Joseph S. Ross et al., Promoting Transparency in PharmaceuticalIndustrySponsored Research, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 72, 78 (2012).
104. Stephanie Ngai et al., Haunted Manuscripts: Ghost Authorship in the Medical
Literature, 12 ACCOUNTABILITY RES. 103, 103 (2005).
105. See Sergio Sismondo & Mathieu Doucet, Publication Ethics and the Ghost
Management of Medical Publication, 24 BIOETHIcs 273, 273 (2010). But see
Epstein & Clarke, supra note 72 at 35-36 (disagreeing with that proposal).
Sismondo had earlier recommended "divorc[ing] the pharmaceutical industry
from published research" on the basis that the "causal connections between
funding and outcomes are relatively unaffected by such commonly proposed
solutions as: stronger disclosure requirements, rigorous trial reporting standards, and trial registries .

. .

. [B]ias is not the result of simple methodological

problems . . . ." Sergio Sismondo, PharmaceuticalCompany Funding and its
Consequences: A Qualitative Systematic Review, 29 CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS

109, 112 (2008) ("The causes of [publication] bias are complicated, rang-

ing from ghost-management of the literature by pharmaceutical companies to
subtle actions provoked by relationships between companies and researchers.").
106. Mirowski & Van Horn, supra note 40, at 531.
107. Id.

108. Id.
109. Id.
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whatever it is that we get at the end of the process . . . ."110 An identifiable
reduction in productivity, the "vast volume of clinical trial information that
never leaks out from proprietary boundaries," and research oriented to marketing (e.g., seeding and switching trials), all point to a reduction in the pursuit of research objectives.I", The changes in university science reflect a view
"largely symptomatic of re-engineered science in the pharmaceuticals and the
CRO industry."I12
The alarmist perspective is not without its critics, as discussed above,
but for my purposes I want to compare and contrast (with other commentators) Mirowski's unique (in legal literature) focus on the systemic and structural effects of commercialization and the economy on science, which effects
are primarily indirect and unrelated to either the intentions of scientists or
scientific misconduct.
III.
A.

DISTORTING SCIENCE IN LAW

Direct Effects

When Law Professors McGarity and Wagner discuss the shaping of science in its association with industry, the term is pejorative.113 Referring to (i)
the Bayh-Dole Patent Amendments of 1980 allowing universities to patent
federally-funded inventions, (ii) the resulting university/industry collaborations in an era of dwindling state support for higher education, (iii) the increased potential for conflicts of interest among university scientists, and (iv)
the pressures on scientists to withhold publication critical of a sponsor's
products, "shaping" constitutes the first (in a list of six) strategies for "bending" science in legal contexts.l1 4 "[C]ollective scientific knowledge does not
always result from scientists dutifully applying the scientific method, but instead sometimes reflects successful efforts by advocates to influence researchers and research outcomes.""15 Rigging clinical trials, distorting
methods, and biasing interpretations, alongside the empirically identifiable
"funding effect" on research (making it favorable to the sponsor), raise concerns about the quality of science in law.116 Other strategies include "hiding
110. Id. at 532.
111. Id. at 533-36. See also Jean 0. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patent Quality
and Research Productivity: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators,
114 EcON. J. 441, 441 (Apr. 2004). ("Research productivity ... has declined

sharply over the last 40 years, in many different industries and countries.").
112. Mirowski & Van Horn, supra note 40, at 536.
113. See THOMAS 0. McGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: How
SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 60, 60-61 (2008).
114. Id. at 88-91.
115. Id. at 95.
116. Id. at 95-96. See generally Sheldon Krimsky, The Funding Effect in Science
and Its Implicationsfor the Judiciary, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 43, 44 (2005).
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science" from regulators, courts, and the public; attacking reliable science;
harassing scientists who produce research perceived as damaging; packaging
expertise to advance a desired outcome; and spinning science by framing and
public relations."17 The authors recommend transparency through disclosures
of conflicts of interest (in litigation and policy contexts),1s requiring access
to data in all (not just federally-funded) completed studies,]19 discouraging
suppression of adverse effects information,120 independent advisory panels,121
peer review of expertise,122 informal consensuses statements,123 greater penalties for abuse of process,124 and enhanced scrutiny of policy-relevant
science. 125
Without questioning the efforts and compelling examples offered by
McGarity and Wagner, their analysis is focused on, and presumes, direct
influences on science by bad actors-profit-making corporations and the
"bent" scientists they hire. While the authors do mention (i) the biases, perhaps unconscious, reflected in the work of well-intentioned scientists, (ii) the
pressures on scientists from industry support and threat of lawsuits, and (iii)

the potential exodus of scientific talent due to harassment strategies,126 the
indirect or systemic effects of the commercialization of science are generally
eclipsed in favor of stories about bad companies and bad people.
B.

Indirect Effects

By contrast, Daniel Lee Kleimans's study of the commercialization of
university biology readily acknowledges criticism (by McGarity and Wagner) that "commercially motivated collaborations between university biologist and science-based companies can skew research agendas, prompt
inappropriate restrictions on the flow of information, and create conflicts of
interest."27 However, Kleinman is more interested in the "subtle landscape"
of academic capitalism-not the direct shaping of research agendas by corporate funding, but how "corporate domination of a field of scientific investigation early in its development can indirectly affect the questions that are
asked and the answers that are acceptable at a later time, even if the later
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See generally McGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 113, at 97.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at
id. at

233.
241.
246.
261-62.
271-72.

See McGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 13, at 273-74.

See id. at 275.

125. See id. at 28--84.
126. See id. at passim.

127.

KLEINMAN,

supra note 23, at x.
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research is not funded by the industry."128 "[M]y claim is that by placing the
focus of our attention on possible threats to the university from direct and
explicit relationships between university scientists and commercial concerns,
we have neglected to notice the less overt, but far more pervasive effects
of . . . commercial culture."29 The laboratory that is the subject of Klein-

man's study is not restricted by its industry sponsors, and there are no "egregious violations of academic norms"-no unusual secrecy or conflicts of
interest-but "there are indirect, systemic effects of the commercial
world."130
Highlighting such indirect effects is, however, controversial. To say "research patrons may shape research agendas, conceptual orientations, and ultimately experimental practice," and to talk about withholding data or
maintaining secrecy in IP protection practices, is threatening to the self-image and assumptions of many scientists-these topics sound like accusations
of substandard work and greed.131 In much of science writing,
Outcomes and effects are explained in individual terms . . . [, pay-

ing] little attention to the shaping and constraining influences of
the larger environment in which scientists do their work. [For example, Natalie] Angier [in Natural Obsessions (1988, 47)] assigns
personalities a pivotal role in . . . laboratories. She points to idiosyncrasies in an individual's biography. . . . [T]he commercial

world hardly seems to exist in Angier's account. 132

Scientists are likely more comfortable with such representations of individual conscious action,133 since
[A] person with an individualist or agency-centered outlook might
find it disconcerting to see a portrayal of her world that attributes
great importance to the impact of structuralfactors on her daily
life. The portrait might seem to implicate the individual's motives,
and if the representation is critical, that criticism might be perceived . . . as a condemnation of the person. 134

128. Id. at xi.
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id. at 4, 6, 17.
131. Id. at 24-26.
132. Id. at 28 (citing NATALIE

ANGlER, NATURAL OBSESSIONS: STRIVING TO UN-

LOCK THE DEEPEST SECRETS OF THE CANCER CELL

47, 170, 299 (First Mariner

Books eds. 1998)).
133.

supra note 23, at 28 ("Individualist beliefs run deep in U.S. culture.
We learn to see the world as the product of individual conscious action. This
KLEINMAN,

orientation permits us to take credit for our success and blame others for their

failures.").
134. Id. at 29.
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Kleinman's study, however, does not suggest "an unrestrained commercial
orientation . . . rather than a dedication to the higher ideals of science," it

instead suggests "scientists are shaped by the larger world in which they
operate," which may be beyond their control and reflects the influences of
the "world of commerce."35 In the laboratory on which Kleinman focuses
his analysis, "the world of commerce does not explicitly dominate the dayto-day lives of [its] members ....

I found no evidence of the kind of viola-

tions of the norms of academic science that concern many analysts of university-industry relations."36 Even in the absence of direct industry funding,
Kleinman argues "research practices can be indirectly shaped by industry."137
Perennial concerns over "corporate influences on the creation of university research agendas, corporate restrictions on the free flow of information,
and questions of control over intellectual property" often reflect a contrast of
our current situation with an assumption "the academy was once an isolated
ivory tower."3 8 Kleinman rejects this contrast, both because
[P]eriods of relatively high levels of faculty autonomy regarding
their capacity to define research agendas and set priorities are relatively few in the history of the American university . . . [,and

because] the attention on the impact of direct relations between
academic scientists and science-based firms .

.

. overlooks the in-

direct but pervasive influences of the world of commerce ... .139
On the first point, "university patrons have affected research agendas and
priorities" since the Civil War, and "private sources of support never meant
absolute autonomy."40 Federal government patronage of academic research,
focused on military interests beginning with World War II, continued after

135. Id. at 29-30. See also Sergio Sismondo, How PharmaceuticalIndustry Funding Affects Trial Outcomes: Causal Structures and Responses, 66 Soc. Sci. &
MED. 1, 2-3 (2008) ([The term] "conflicts of interest". . . [i]s misleading. The
term suggests that researchers act inappropriately to further their own interests.
However, it is not clear that medical researchers have material interests in par-

ticular results. When funding affects individual researchers' actions, we might
interpret those actions in roughly behaviorist terms, rather than as calculated . . . . If we see funding as a form of gift giving . . . gifts create strong
dispositions or obligations to reciprocate . .. .Sponsorship, then, creates subtle
influences through the building of relationships that lead researchers to see the
pharmaceutical companies with which they interact, and their products, in a
more favorable light than they would otherwise.).
136.

KLEINMAN,

supra note 23, at 31.

137. Id. at 32.
138. Id. at 33, 35.
139. Id. at 35.
140. Id. at 37-38.
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the war and cannot be viewed as "unrestricted support."l41 Withholding data
or other materials from colleagues is more likely to be a function of protecting one's own discoveries and publication opportunities, as it is a function of
financial arrangements with a sponsor; research has always been influenced
by research group affiliation, pressures from colleagues, and "professional
norms [that] shape criteria for accepting results."42 There was never a period
of disinterested and freely-shared scientific knowledge in the university.143
On the second point, Kleinman tries to account for organizational and
institutional structures (i.e., not sustained only by individually chosen acts)
that "establish distinctive resource distributions, capacities and incapacities,
and define specific constraints and opportunities for actors depending on
structural location."l44 For example, the dominance of the chemical industry
in agricultural pest-control research is reflected in
[T]he ways scholarly writing in the field is framed, the way experiments are organized, the measures of success that are used and
the tools that are available .

. .

. [I]ndustry affected [more recent]

scientific practice not directly through research funding, but indirectly through institutionalized standards and tools developed
through earlier industry-supported research.145
After funding "some but not other research," and establishing standards and
tools, "no direct intervention . . . by industry needed to occur for the influence to be felt."146

Legal structures play a significant role in Kleinman's analysis of indirect effects in the world of commerce, insofar as "resources and power asymmetries" affect scientific findings.147 Kleinman recounts an episode he
observed in the university laboratory when an academic scientist questioned
the reliability of test results provided at reduced cost by a company analyzing
on a contract basis.148 The scientist asked the company to repeat the analysis
141. Id. at 38-39.
142. KLEINMAN, supra note 23, at 42-43.
143. Id. at 42.
144. Id. at 61 (citing Leon Lindberg, The Problems of Economic Theory in Explaining Economic Performance, 459 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 14,

15-17 (1982)).
145. Id. at 88-89.

146. Id. at 89. Kleinman offers the example of kits "to increase efficiency and reliability by providing all (or many) of the materials necessary to undertake a test
or procedure in a standardized form." Id. at 107. Today's scientists' "outlook
and daily practice . . . has been shaped by the widespread availability of stan-

dardized research tools." Id. at 112.
147. Id. at 92.

148.

KLEINMAN,

supra note 23, at 99-101.
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(for free) or report the risk of unreliability; the company responded to the
lab's "extortion" by threatening legal action if the scientist's "erroneous and
untrue" charges were to be published.149 Having no power to pressure the
company, and no resources to conduct independent tests (or, even if the lab
did, to fight a legal battle), the lab backed down.150 Thus "we see a particular
structure that constitutes a distinctive set of resource distributions, capacities
and incapacities; it defines variations in opportunity and constraint by structural location."15' Intellectual property law is also an example of indirect or
structural effects: "some researchers and policymakers express concern that
commitments to intellectual property protection in university settings can undermine traditions of free intellectual exchange . . . . Recent developments

illustrate how the patenting of research tools could hinder scientific investigation."52 Consider how the intellectual property regime shapes university
science when a "threat of legal action could prompt university labs not to do
something they might do under different circumstances."153 A company "has
the capacity to enforce its position through litigation, [while individual] university scientists are unlikely to have this ability."54
Beyond issues of research funding, academic scientists work within a
world of constraints. Kleinman concedes the "extent of these indirect influences on academic science is difficult to measure," and the "indirect effects
of the commercial world on the practice of academic science are difficult to
see and easier to ignore than the direct factors that have been the focus of
controversy."155 He recommends universities start to notice that some areas
are vibrant and others stunted, and suggests universities develop "institutionalized reflexivity" to identify the costs and benefits of seeking IP protection
in their laboratories.156

Mirowski has more recently, and more comprehensively, focused on
measuring these indirect effects of the economy on science.

149. Id. at 100-01.
150. Id. at 102. This is an example of scientific "self-censorship." See generally
James Robert Brown, Self-Censorship, in LAW AND ETHICS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: REGULATION, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND LIABILITY 82, 82-94 (T.
Lemmens & D.R. Waring eds., 2006). Other examples include ignoring "certain medical problems . . . because they are financially unrewarding; choosing a
lucrative field of research; deliberate ignorance in light of legal liability; and
avoiding criticism of industry. Id. at 86-88.
151.

KLEINMAN,

supra note 23, at 103.

152. Id. at 114-15.
153. Id. at 123.
154. Id. at 125.
155. Id. at 89, 162; see also Brown, supra note 150, at 82 ("self-censorship is almost
wholly non-quantitative, and its extent is thus very difficult to measure").
156.

KLEINMAN,

supra note 23, at 161.
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Returning to Mirowski
If we avoid viewing these phenomena as the dubious behaviors of
a few misguided individuals or transgressions of the terminally
greedy, and instead approach them as structural changes in the
organization of science, then it will become possible to regard
them as harbingers of the future of privatized science.157

Mirowski acknowledges the problem of measurement in assessing the
"harm" to science through commercialization. Bibliometric research provides some measure of the decline in the United States' scientific publication
"output."158 Mirowski explains that phenomenon in terms of the decline in
the United States' dominance in science, a shrinking of the corporate sector,
globalization and outsourcing of research and development, and the hobbling
of "research output of state universities . . . by commercialized demands and

the relinquishment of their public service orientation."]59 Measuring the degradation of science quality is even more difficult, but Mirowski-rejecting
the focus on individual responsibility and the possibility of fraud-tries to
"set out some relatively tractable notions of 'good science,' starting from
some aggregate measure, and [ask] what has happened to them."160
Mirowski offers three examples, beginning with the rise of "just-intime" science: "the forced inducement of quick and dirty techniques to produce attenuated results on schedule, under budget, and within the parameters
of contractual relations."61 Mirowski's second example is the "sound science" (or "anti-junk science") movement wherein hidden organizations promote industry-friendly, or, in litigation terms, "defense-friendly science."162
This segment of Mirowski's argument mirrors McGarity and Wagner, and
seems less compelling because it appears to be an example of fraud, or "bad
apples," rather than a structural phenomenon. His third example is the degradation of patent quality; this argument finds support in IP literature.163 As the
rate of patenting has dramatically increased, there has been a rapid increase
in low-quality (lower relative importance and generality) patents granted to
universities.164 One recent study estimated "28% of patents would be found
157. Mirowski & Van Horn, supra note 40, at 514.
158.

MIROWSKI,

supra note 11, at 266-67.

159. Id. at 285.
160. Id. at 288.
161. Id. at 290.
162. Id. at 297-99 (providing examples such as casting doubt on good science, de-

manding more research or more "sound" science to order, or harass scientists).
163. Id. at 305-06.
164. See Rebecca Henderson et al., Universities as a Source of Commercial Technology: A DetailedAnalysis of University Patenting, 80 REV. EcoN. & STAT. I,
1-2 (1998).
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at least partially invalid if subject to an anticipation or obviousness
decision."165
IV.

CONCLUSION

Legal literature on scientific expertise too often focuses on the need for
"fair, unbiased testimony and opinions" not "swayed by monetary reward." 66
Legal scholars highlight direct conflicts of interest, but rarely discuss the
systemic and structural effects on "how we do research or what we find
there."167 The purpose of this article is to suggest a broader discourse in law
concerning the "economic impacts on the directions of scientific thought,
argument, and controversy," toward conceptualizing the interaction of science and economy as a "process of ongoing (re)construction [wherein] each
conditions the development of the other."68
In short, an individualistic focus on more frequent disclosure of financial conflicts of interest,169 higher methodological quality,170 or ensuring one
avoids favoring "a particular outcome .. . [or accepting] remuneration geared

to the outcome of a research project,"I71 does not begin to address the systematic and structural changes brought about by economic forces on science.
Such changes are not only hard to identify, and even more difficult to measure, but also require a new vocabulary or discursive regime. An interdisciplinary engagement with the growing literature regarding the economics of
science reveals the appropriate analytical division for legal assessments of
scientific reliability is not simply between good scientists and those guilty of
misconduct (an easier problem to identify), or between commercially funded
and "independent" research (because either may be biased), but rather a more
complex, albeit fundamental, division between open and privatized science.
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